


Figures and tables to:

Social Capital: One or Many?
Definition and measurement

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Figure 1. Three families of social capital concepts



Note: The three families of definitions (fa1) to (fa3) are tied together by the equations (1) to (3) below. Note also the distinction between *generalized* and *special trust* that has not been shown, but will be discussed. Nan Lin's definition is discussed in IV.3 only.

Table 1. Terminology

A, the population considered	Ω_A , social capital in A
p_i , a person in A, $i = 1, \dots, n$	ω_i , social capital of p_i

Table 2. Three reasons to cooperate when successful cooperation is an advantage

i	Group members cooperate for their own reasons. (a) They trust that everybody else will do their part. (b) They follow an abstract sense of duty. (c) They behave well for moral and religious reasons
ii	Group members cooperate due to pressure within the group. They may choose a decision structure and a leader, but the whole process is within the group. Group members have voluntarily chosen to join, and can leave ^{a)}
iii	A third party - outside the group - enforces the cooperation

a. Groups are organised for a purpose so rules, regulating exit are likely, but exit is possible. Criminal associations such as mafias have no exit possibility. The exit condition may thus be used to single out criminal organizations.

Table 3. The relationship between the trust-cooperation-complex and production

Approach	Character of link
Production function	Social capital is a factor of production
Transaction costs	Transactions are easier in the presence of trust
Monitoring costs	Social capital allows cheap self-monitoring

Note: See also Section VI.2 on the relation between social capital and investments.

Table 4. Example of prisoners' dilemma game

		B cooperates (keeps trust)	
		Yes	No
A cooperates (keeps trust)	Yes	a: (7, 7)	b: (2, 8)
	No	d: (8, 2)	c: (4, 4)

Table 5. Example of changes made by benevolent dictator

Same game as in Table 4 The punishment is 5		B cooperates	
		Yes	No
A cooperates	Yes	a: (7, 7)	b: (2, 8-5)
	No	d: (8-5, 2)	c: (4-5, 4-5)

Table 6. Example of changes made by benevolent donor

Same game as in Table 4 The premium is 7		B cooperates	
		Yes	No
A cooperates	Yes	a: (7+7, 7+7)	b: (2+7, 8)
	No	d: (8, 2+7)	c: (4, 4)

Table 7. Some questionnaire problems

Saliency	The more salient a question is the more robust are the answers to the wording of the question
Goodness	People like to be nice and good, ie they are likely to give sympathetic answers to soft broad questions
Concreteness	It is much easier to get robust answers to concrete than to abstract questions
Closed better than open	It is much quicker (and hence cheaper) to get answers to closed question, ie questions where the possible answers are given in advance.
Comparison	It is important - but difficult - to make the questions so basic and clear that they are translatable from one language and culture to another.

Figure 2. The relation between two series related to social capital it the World Value Survey





Figure 3. Hypothetical example of the social networks on an island



Note: Ovals show couples. Thickness of lines points to strength of links.

Table 8. The double-entry bookkeeping of Putnam's Instrument

Definition	Counting people	Counting organizations
Person p_i belongs to y_i organizations	$i = 1, \dots, n$ people	$j = 1, \dots, m$ organizations
Organization j has z_j members	$N = \sum_i y_i$	$M = \sum_j z_j$
	Putnam's Instrument $\Pi = N/n = M/n$	